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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF OTAH, 
P l a i n t i f f - R e s p o n d e n t , 
: C a s e N o . 
- v s - 1 3 9 9 5 
MARK A. SCHOENFELD, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant was charged with the crime of manslaughter 
under the Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (1953), as.amended. This is 
an appeal from a jury verdict of guilty to the lesser included 
offense of negligent homicide rendered in the Third Judicial 
District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Bryant H. Croft, Judge, presiding. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On the 5th day of February, 1975, a jury found the 
appellant guilty of negligent homicide under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-206 (1953) , as amended, and appellant was sentenced by 
the Honorable Bryant H. Croft to one year in the County Jail. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming 
the verdict of the jury and the judgment of the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
With the following notations, additions, and excep-
tions, respondent agrees with appellant's statement of facts. 
1. The date of the beer parties at the Spruces in 
Big Cottonwood Canyon that set the scene for the events leading 
up to appellant's trial was July 28, 1974 (R.7'6) . 
2. Dee Johnson denied making any homosexual advances 
on appellant Schoenfeld (R.175) . 
3. After Schoenfeld and Johnson had words following 
their arrival at the Canyon Inn, Schoenfeld left and returned 
to have more words with Johnson's group, and Johnson, on 
several occasions in the parking lot (R.92) . 
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4. Schoenfeld admitted that he had shot into his 
arm some speed (amphetamines) within twenty-four hours prior 
to the shooting (R.311). 
5. There was evidence indicating that when appel-
lant's memory was fresher he recalled having said to Austin 
and Guthrie that he wanted to "get that queer" rather than 
"fight that queer." (R.230). Further, in the same conversa-
tion, Schoenfeld asked Austin for the gun. Austin did not offer 
it to Schoenfeld (R.181,320,325). 
6. It was not established that the deceased Versluis 
had knocked down both Austin and Guthrie. Rather, it appeared 
that Ehrler had been involved in that particular scuffle (R.190). 
7. The victim Versluis was not necessarily running 
towards Schoenfeld when the latter was returning to Guthrie's 
car prior to the warning that Schoenfeld had a gun and at which 
time he fired the gun in Versluis1 direction (R.152,224,227). 
8. Schoenfeld1s warning that he had a gun and that 
"if you think I'm fucking around you are crazy" was made after 
Ehrler had sounded a warning and after Versluis had stopped 
running. Ehrler and other witnesses agree on this order of 
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events in assured fashion (R.152,225,227,244). 
9. I t was not es tabl i shed a t t r i a l t ha t Versluis 
grabbed the gun as Schoenfeld entered the car . Only the 
appellant said tha t the gun was grabbed. The others saw 
Versluis lunge and come in to contact with Schoenfeld and heard 
shots go off as that contact was made (R.198,245). Furthermore/ 
the physical evidence and expert analysis showed that the appel-
lant would have had to squeeze the t r igger twice—each time in 
contact with the v i c t im ' s chest (R .316,336-7) . 
10. The evidence was in conf l ic t as to whether the 
gun was next to Versluis on the ground af ter the f i r ings or in 
his hands. The witness to the l a t t e r admitted that Ehrler , who 
saw i t at the v ic t im's fee t , reached the body f i r s t (R.277). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN 
ITS INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY AS TO THE LAW DEFINING JUSTIFIABLE 
HOMICIDE. 
The Court, using Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402 (1953), 
as amended in 1973 and 1974, advised the jury in Instruction 14 
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(R.58) a s t o t h e law g o v e r n i n g j u s t i f i a b l e u s e of f o r c e in 
d e f e n s e of p e r s o n . The Cour t e x p l a i n e d t h a t : 
"Under t h e law of t h e s t a t e o f 
Utah c o n d u c t which i s j u s t i f i e d i s a 
d e f e n s e t o p r o s e c u t i o n for any o f f e n s e 
b a s e d on t h a t c o n d u c t . Under our law 
a p e r s o n i s l e g a l l y j u s t i f i e d i n u s i n g 
• f o r c e which i s i n t e n d e d o r l i k e l y t o cause 
d e a t h o r s e r i o u s b o d i l y i n j u r y o n l y i f he 
r e a s o n a b l y b e l i e v e s t h a t t h e f o r c e used i s 
n e c e s s a r y t o p r e v e n t d e a t h or s e r i o u s 
b o d i l y i n j u r y t o h i m s e l f or t o a t h i r d ' 
p e r s o n . 
However, a p e r s o n i s n o t j u s t i f i e d 
i n u s i n g f o r c e under t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s 
s e t f o r t h in the p r e c e d i n g p a r a g r a p h i f he 
e i t h e r : 
(a) I n i t i a l l y p r o v o k e s t h e u s e of 
f o r c e a g a i n s t h i m s e l f w i t h t h e i n t e n t t o 
u s e f o r c e a s an e x c u s e t o i n f l i c t b o d i l y 
harm upon t h e a s s a i l a n t ; or 
(b) I s a t t e m p t i n g t o commit, i s 
c o m m i t t i n g , o r i s f l e e i n g a f t e r t h e commis-
s i o n o r a t t e m p t e d commission of a f e l o n y and , 
under t h e l aw, i t i s a f e l o n y i f one uses a 
d e a d l y weapon in t h r e a t e n i n g t o do b o d i l y . 
i n j u r y t o a n o t h e r and accompan ies t h a t t h r e a t 
by a show of immedia te f o r c e or v i o l e n c e ; or 
(c) Was the a g g r e s s o r o r was engaged i n 
combat by a g r e e m e n t , u n l e s s he w i t h d r a w s from 
t h e e n c o u n t e r and e f f e c t i v e l y communicates t o 
such o t h e r p e r s o n h i s i n t e n t t o do so and t h e 
o t h e r n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g c o n t i n u e s or t h r e a t e n s t o 
c o n t i n u e t h e u s e of u n l a w f u l f o r c e a g a i n s t h im. 
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An aggressor i s one who wi l l ing ly 
and knowingly i n i t i a l l y provokes a combat 
or does ac t s of such a nature as would 
ord inar i ly lead to combat. A person can 
. a l so be c l a s s i f i ed as an aggressor i f he 
leaves the scene of a quarrel / arms him-
self/ and then re tu rns to the scene and 
renews the qua r re l . 
Whether or not force used by one 
against an aggressor i s unlawful depends 
upon the circumstances. Under the law a 
p r i v a t e c i t i z e n when confronted by o ne 
committing a public offense against him 
by the use of a gun i s authorized to use 
whatever force i s necessary t o disarm 
that person and to prevent h i s escape," 
Ins t ruc t ion No. 14. (Emphasis added.) 
A. Appel lant ' s f i r s t claim i s tha t the Court below 
misstated the law in the underlined portion of subparagraph 
(b) of Ins t ruc t ion 14 and tha t , i n e f fec t , the misstatement 
cons t i tu ted a comment on the evidence. The portion re fer red 
to followed the expression tha t the defense of j u s t i f i a b l e 
homicide is not avai lable i f the force was used in connection 
with the commission (or attempted commission) of a felony. 
There the Court s ta ted that " . . . under the law i t i s a felony 
if one uses a deadly weapon in threatening to do bodily injury 
to another and accompanies that t h r ea t by a show of immediate 
force or violence." (Emphasis added.) Appellant a l leges that 
~ 6 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-506 (1953), as amended, provides that 
such behavior could be c l a s s i f i ed as a misdemeanor, and tha t 
f a i l u r e to i n s t r u c t on tha t bas is was e r ror and cons t i tu ted a 
finding of fact by the cour t . 
Respondent submits tha t the emphasized words in the 
challenged portion of the jury ins t ruc t ion spe l l the difference 
between the s t a t u t e appel lant r e l i e s upon and Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-103 (1953), as amended in 1974, which formed the basis 
of the Court ' s i n s t ruc t i on . Because of tha t difference the 
ins t ruc t ion was a correct statement of the law as i t applies 
to t h i s case . 
The crime tha t was charged was an "offense against 
the person," as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (Supp. 
1975). Similar ly , the questioned ins t ruc t ion r e l a t ed to the 
j u s t i f i a b l e use of such force against a person who i s threatening 
the user of the force. In t h i s s e t t i n g , the correct ins t ruc t ion 
to be given a jury i s one which re fe r s to force used against 
such a person. I t was not questioned at t r i a l tha t appel lant 
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Schoenfeld drew a t t en t ion to and f i red a gun in the d i rec t ion 
of the deceased shor t ly before the f a t a l shots were f i red 
(R.312). In order for the j u s t i f i a b l e homicide defense to 
be complete, both ac ts must be j u s t i f i e d . The Court cor rec t ly 
ins t ruc ted on the bas i s of aggravated assau l t against another . 
The jury s t i l l had the duty of finding whether or not Schoenfeld 
drew his weapon and threatened another person, or i f he general ly 
displayed i t to the crowd. The fact that the Code has a s t a t u t e 
covering the l a t t e r i n t e rp re t a t i on was i r r e l evan t to the jury, 
because tha t s t a t u t e did not involve a felony—and the crime 
charged against appellant was manslaughter. 
By t h i s l ine of reasoning, i t is apparent tha t the 
Court not only ins t ruc ted the jury co r rec t ly , but properly l e f t 
the i n t e rp re t a t i on of evidence to them. But even i f the Court 
below had erred in not making c lear i t s i n s t ruc t i ons , the fact 
tha t the jury found the defendant g u i l t y of negligent homicide 
should lead the Court to a conclusion that such error would have 
been non-pre judic ia l . 
For complete ana lys i s , i t must be remembered tha t the 
jury did not find tha t the defendant had been l ega l ly j u s t i f i e d 
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i n h i s u se o f f o r c e upon t h e d e c e a s e d V e r s l u i s . Nor d i d i t 
f i n d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t had commi t t ed t h e p r i m a r y c h a r g e of 
m a n s l a u g h t e r . These f a c t s must n e c e s s a r i l y l e a d t o a c o n -
s i d e r a t i o n o f whe the r t h e a l l e g e d e r r o r s a f f e c t e d t h e 
a p p e l l a n t ' s s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s . When h e a r i n g an a p p e a l on a 
c r i m i n a l c a u s e , t h i s Cour t must d i s r e g a r d e r r o r s which a r e n o t 
p r e j u d i c i a l , and t h e r e a l t e s t of p r e j u d i c i a l e r r o r i s whe the r 
t h e p a r t y ' s s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s have been a f f e c t e d . See Utah 
Code Ann. § 7 7 - 4 2 - 1 ( 1 9 5 3 ) , a s amended; S t a t e v . N e a l , 1 Utah 
2d 1 2 2 , 262 P .2d 756 (1953) ; and S t a t e v . C l u f f , 48 Utah 102 , 
158 P a c . 701 ( 1 9 1 6 ) . 
In o r d e r t o d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r S c h o e n f e l d ' s s u b s t a n t i a l 
r i g h t s were a f f e c t e d by t h e j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n , No. 1 4 ( b ) , t h e 
Cour t must k e e p i n mind t h e f a c t - d e t e r m i n a t i o n and a p p l i c a t i o n -
t o - l a w i s s u e s t h a t were b e f o r e t h e j u r y w i t h t h e i n s t r u c t i o n . 
I t i s i m p o r t a n t t o n o t e , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t when such j u r y i s s u e s 
a r e r a i s e d on a p p e a l t h e C o u r t s h o u l d v iew t h e j u r y ' s d e c i s i o n 
i n a f a v o r a b l e l i g h t and s h o u l d be r e l u c t a n t t o s u b s t i t u t e i t s 
own judgment f o r t h a t o f t h e j u r y . T h i s i n v o l v e s r e c o g n i t i o n of 
t h e j u r y ' s p r i v i l e g e by b e l i e v i n g t h o s e p a r t s of t h e e v i d e n c e 
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which support t h e i r conclusion, plus drawing a l l reasonable 
inferences which should be deducted therefrom. See State v . 
Murphy, 26 Utah 2d 330, 489 P.2d 430 (1971) ; and State v., 
Knepper, 18 Utah 2d 215, 418 P.2d 780 (1966). 
Let us explore, hypothet ica l ly , the j u r y ' s reasoning 
when i t re fe r red to the Ins t ruc t ion 14 (with pa r t i cu la r reference 
to subparagraph (b) which describes the elements of a felonious 
assaul t ) and applied the fac t s as they had found them to the 
law described in that i n s t ruc t i on . Had the jury found that the 
defendant/appellant was gui l ty of such a felony, and determined 
tha t j u s t i f i a b l e homicide could not be claimed therefor , then 
the same logic would necessar i ly have led them to a verdic t of 
gu i l t y of manslaughter. Referring to the ins t ruc t ions defining 
manslaughter (R.56,57), there would then be at l eas t a "reckless" 
causing of Vers lu is ' death as shown by an awareness of the 
above determined unjus t i f iab le r i s k , or a finding tha t death was 
caused while Schoenfeld reasonably believed a moral or l e g a l 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n exis ted , although i t was not l ega l ly j u s t i f i a b l e . 
Negligent homicide, the j u r y ' s verd ic t , has as an 
element that the actor " . . . ought to have been aware. . ." 
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See unchallenged ins t ruc t ion 17 (R.61) ; and State v . T r i t t # 23 
Utah 2d 365, 463 P.2d 806 (1969). In order to have found 
negligent homicide, the ju ry could not have been able to f ind 
beyond a reasonable doubt tha t the appel lant was aware tha t a 
subs tan t ia l and unjus t i f iab le r i sk t o another was present as 
a r e s u l t of h is a c t s . I f they had, manslaughter would have been 
appropr ia te . To have the defense of j u s t i f i a b l e defense of 
person, Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402 (1953), as amended, the 
defendant must have reasonably believed tha t the act ion taken 
was necessary. By the same l ine of reasoning, he must be held 
to have been aware of the r i sk created by taking the ac t ion . 
Can a person "reasonably believe" tha t i t i s necessary to 
threaten another person 's l i f e or heal th in order to preserve 
h i s own, but not be aware of the r i s k created thereby t o that 
person 's l i f e ? 
The ju ry , for these reasons , could not have cons i s ten t ly 
found an exception to j u s t i f i a b l e homicide in using the judge ' s 
ins t ruc t ions to the jury and then found the defendant gu i l ty of 
negligent homicide. Therefore, even if the ins t ruc t ion is found 
to be in e r ro r , i t must be c l a s s i f i e d as harmless, not p re jud ic ia l 
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e r ro r , because no subs tan t ia l r i g h t of the appel lant could 
have been invaded. 
B. The appe l l an t ' s second argument concerning the 
ins t ruc t ion tha t defined j u s t i f i a b l e homicide i s tha t the 
Court commented on the evidence in i t s def in i t ion of "aggressor, ' 
as used in subparagraph (c) . The statement was made t h a t "a • 
person can also be c l a s s i f i ed as an aggressor i f he leaves the 
scene of a quar re l , arms himself, and then re turns to the scene 
and renews the quar re l . " Appellant argues tha t no pr io r quarre l 
with the deceased could be found by any possible i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
of the f a c t s , but that the jury i s misled into thinking that the 
quarre l renewed with Mr. Johnson by Schoenfeld would make the 
l a t t e r an "aggressor" as refer red to in the i n s t r u c t i o n . The 
ef fec t , i t i s again al leged, would have been to keep the jury 
from considering the j u s t i f i a b l e homicide defense. 
I t i s respondent 's posi t ion that the Court co r rec t ly 
s ta ted the law and l e f t the fact finding to the ju ry . The jury 
had heard a l l the evidence. They knew the circumstances to 
which the de f in i t ion may or may not apply. They were not in a 
pos i t ion to be misled as to who quarreled with whom. 
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Appellant does not question the general v a l i d i t y of 
the statement of law quoted above. What appel lant does 
question i s tha t s ta tement ' s app l i cab i l i t y to the f ac t s . 
There i s no question in the record tha t Schoenfeld returned 
to the scene and renewed his quarre l with Mr. Johnson, not the 
deceased Versluis (R.293). But, with reference to the "aggressor" 
exclusion from the defense of j u s t i f i a b l e homicide/ there i s a 
question as to whether Schoenfeld, in e f fec t , renewed a general 
quarrel which could be seen as the "one" tha t resul ted in Vers luis 1 
death. The boundary of tha t quarre l was a question of fact for 
the jury, and i t was properly ins t ruc ted as to the law which 
would apply to that finding of f a c t . 
In his conclusion, appellant argues tha t the Court did 
not in s t ruc t on the basis of the re being more than one quar re l . 
Appellant nei ther requested such an in s t ruc t ion or cal led the 
omission to the Court ' s a t t e n t i o n . (Further, i t i s l ike ly tha t 
such an ins t ruc t ion would have cons t i tu ted a comment on the f ac t s . ) 
Where no exception i s taken to a f a i lu re ,to ins t ruc t , t he pol icy 
of t h i s Court has been, and should remain, to not notice such 
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fa i lu re to in s t ruc t without a showing of p re jud ic ia l e r r o r . 
See State v. Peterson, 121 Utah 229, 240 P.2d 504 (1952). 
With that in mind, respondent feels i t important to 
point out tha t appe l l an t ' s a t torney countered any effect the 
omission may have had upon the jury by explaining and arguing 
to the jury h i s i n t e rp re t a t i on of the fac ts as they apply to 
the quarre l or quarre ls which preceded the shooting (R.356-360). 
Furthermore, i t i s respondent*s contention t h a t , even 
i f the Court ' s def in i t ion of "aggressor" was found to be in error 
because of a misleading e f fec t , any er ror could not have been 
p re jud ic i a l to a p p e l l a n t ' s subs t an t i a l r i g h t s . As explained more 
ful ly in par t A of t h i s point , if the jury had found the fac ts to 
be such tha t j u s t i f i a b l e homicide was capable of being considered, 
i . e . , that Schoenfeld reasonably believed t h a t h i s action was 
necessary, but found neither exclusion (b) or (c) of Ins t ruc t ion 
14 to apply to the appel lant , then the same facts and inductions 
therefrom would lead to a finding of g u i l t y of manslaughter, and 
not negligent homicide. 
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A p p e l l a n t a l s o a l l e g e s a m i s s t a t e m e n t of t h e l aw 
i n t h e l a s t p a r a g r a p h of I n s t r u c t i o n 1 4 . I t i s n o t c l e a r how 
he c o n t e n d s t h a t i t h a s been m i s s t a t e d . However, a r e a d i n g 
of t h a t p a r a g r a p h i n c o n t e x t w i t h t h e r e s t o f t h e i n s t r u c t i o n 
and r e f e r e n c e t o Utah Code Ann. § 7 6 - 2 - 4 0 2 ( 1 ) ( 1 9 5 3 ) , a s amended, 
w i l l make c l e a r t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e e x p r e s s i o n of t h e l a w . That 
p o r t i o n o f t h e Code r e a d s : 
" ( 1 ) A p e r s o n i s j u s t i f i e d i n 
t h r e a t e n i n g or u s i n g f o r c e a g a i n s t 
a n o t h e r when and t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t he 
r e a s o n a b l y b e l i e v e s t h a t such f o r c e i s 
n e c e s s a r y t o d e f e n d h i m s e l f or a t h i r d 
p e r s o n a g a i n s t such o t h e r ' s imminent 
use o f u n l a w f u l f o r c e ; however , a p e r s o n 
i s j u s t i f i e d i n u s i n g f o r c e which i s 
i n t e n d e d or l i k e l y t o c a u s e d e a t h o r 
s e r i o u s b o d i l y i n j u r y o n l y i f he 
r e a s o n a b l y b e l i e v e s t h a t t h e f o r c e i s 
n e c e s s a r y t o p r e v e n t d e a t h o r s e r i o u s 
b o d i l y i n j u r y t o h i m s e l f o r a t h i r d 
p e r s o n , or t o p r e v e n t t h e commiss ion of 
a f o r c i b l e f e l o n y . " 
F o r t h e f o r e g o i n g r e a s o n s , i t i s c l e a r t h a t t h e t r i a l 
c o u r t d i d n o t commit p r e j u d i c i a l e r r o r i n i n s t r u c t i n g t h e j u r y 
a s t o the law a s i t a p p l i e s t o j u s t i f i a b l e h o m i c i d e . 
POINT I I 
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT REVIEW THE SUFFICIENCY OF 
EVIDENCE LEADING TO APPELLANT' S CONVICTION WITHOUT A CLEAR 
SHOWING OF ERROR. 
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This Court, in accord with long-establ ished 
precedent, has held t h a t i t w i l l not review the sufficiency 
of evidence to support an appe l l an t ' s conviction unless there 
i s a c lear showing tha t the evidence could not support the 
convict ion. See Sta te v.. Johnson, 76 Utah 84, 91, 287 Pac. 
909 (1930) ; Wyatt v. Baughman, 121 Utah 98, 239 P.2d 193 
(1951). In shor t , there i s a strong presumption in favor of 
the v a l i d i t y of the verd ic t and every reasonable intendment 
must be indulged in support of such judgment, un t i l and unless 
the complaining par ty can demonstrate the e r ro r of such judg-
ment. Burton v. Zions Cooperative Mercantile I n s t i t u t i o n , 
122 Utah 360, 249 P.2d 514 (1952). 
In the ins tan t case, there i s no aff i rmat ive showing 
tha t the conviction was obtained without su f f i c ien t evidence. 
Appel lant ' s contention i s t ha t , focusing on the s truggle in or 
about the car door, h is act of pull ing the t r i gge r must neces-
s a r i l y have been e i ther acc identa l , which, he claims, would 
excuse the homicide, or i n t e n t i o n a l , which would cons t i tu t e 
manslaughter. Appellant f a i l s to consider a very l ike ly 
in t e rp re t a t i on of the sequence of events which led to that 
pul l ing of the t r i g g e r . 
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In looking back at the evidence which had been 
presented to them, the jury might reasonably have found t h a t 
there had been a se r i e s of disconnected quarrels which 
culminated in the appellant re turning toward h is f r i end ' s 
car to make an e x i t . Focusing on t h i s point in the sequence 
of events, they might have determinated tha t when Schoenfeld 
drew, ca l led a t t en t ion t o , and consequently f i red h i s p i s t o l , 
a new s i tua t ion had been crea ted . Treating t h i s as a log ica l 
s t a r t ing point for the ac t s which led to Vers lu i s ' death, the 
jury would then have looked to the i n s t ruc t ions to begin f i t t i n g 
the fac t s to the law. 
Ins t ruc t ions 12 and 13 (manslaughter, R.56 and 57) , 
and 17 (negligent homicide, R.61), refer to the creat ion of a 
" subs tan t i a l and un jus t i f i ab le r i sk to another" by the ac t s of 
an accused. In both cases, the r i sk i s the same and, in each 
case, the charge i s for a homicide which resu l ted from the 
accused person 's f a i lu re to reac t cor rec t ly to that r i s k . The 
element which separates the charges of manslaughter and negligent 
homicide (clear ly brought out in the refer red to ins t ruct ions) i s 
that of awareness or perception of the "subs tant ia l and u n j u s t i -
f iable r i sk" created. 
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Finding that Schoenfeld had, by drawing and f i r ing 
the gun, created a new s i tua t ion which necessar i ly r i sked the 
l ives of o the r s , and over which only he had cont ro l , the jury 
may have been unable to find beyond a reasonable doubt that 
he was aware of the r i s k to anyone who might t r y to disarm him 
if he did not make c lear h is in ten t ion to r e t r e a t . If the 
jury were unable to find appellant was aware of that r i s k , or 
tha t he in t en t iona l ly pulled the t r i g g e r , they would therefore 
find tha t manslaughter and j u s t i f i a b l e homicide were unavailable. 
The act was not excusable because the appellant was not doing a 
lawful ac t by lawful means, and fur ther , a dangerous weapon was 
used. See Ins t ruc t ion 15 (R.59) . 
But, they may have found cons is ten t ly and without 
doubt that Schoenfeld ought to have been aware of the nature 
of the r i s k tha t he had created by ca l l ing a t t en t ion to the 
gun and then f i r ing i t in to the ground. Further , he ca r e l e s s ly , 
and grossly so, handled the new s i tua t ion (which he had created) 
by turning and running to the door, tempting Versluis to attempt 
t o disarm or stop him before he shot the gun again. The appel-
lant had not made c lear his i n t e n t i o n s , nor had he kept con t ro l 
of the s i t ua t ion as a reasonably prudent person ought to under 
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t h o s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s . 
Such n e g l i g e n c e i s s u f f i c i e n t t o c o n s t i t u t e 
c r i m i n a l n e g l i g e n c e . As t h i s Cour t e x p l a i n e d i n S t a t e v . 
Linqman, 97 Utah 180 , 199 , 91 P . 2 d 457 ( 1 9 3 9 ) ; 
"The i n g r e d i e n t of i n t r i n s i c 
d a n g e r o u s n e s s , p l u s t h e u n l a w f u l 
manner o r l a c k of due c a r e and c i r -
c u m s p e c t i o n demanded by t h e n a t u r e 
of t h e a c t , even be t h a t s l i g h t , 
c o n s t i t u t e s c r i m i n a l n e g l i g e n c e . " 
I t i s t h e r e f o r e a p p a r e n t t h a t , under a r e a s o n a b l e 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e e v i d e n c e adduced and a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e 
i n s t r u c t i o n s g i v e n , t h e j u r y c o u l d f i n d t h e a p p e l l a n t g u i l t y 
of n e g l i g e n t h o m i c i d e . 
CONCLUSION 
The t r i a l c o u r t d i d no t commit p r e j u d i c i a l e r r o r 
i n i t s i n s t r u c t i o n t o t h e j u r y c o n c e r n i n g j u s t i f i a b l e 
h o m i c i d e . F u r t h e r , c o n s i d e r i n g t h e e v i d e n c e adduced i n i t s 
b e s t l i g h t w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e v e r d i c t , t h a t e v i d e n c e was 
s u f f i c i e n t f o r t h e j u r y t o f i n d t h e a p p e l l a n t g u i l t y of t h e 
l e s s e r i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e of n e g l i g e n t h o m i c i d e . T h e r e was 
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no clear showing of error that the case is otherwise. 
The State submits that the conviction be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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